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Facts, Rights, and Remedies:
Implementing International Law in the
Israel/Palestine Conflict
By GEORGE E. BISHARAT*
Welcome to this symposium. This brief introduction will spell
out what has brought us together today, and what the symposium
participants hope to accomplish over the next day and a half of
discussions.
It is fair to say that what brought our group together initially was
a shared sense of deep alarm over the direction that events in the
Middle East generally, and Israel/Palestine specifically, have taken in
recent years. This sense of alarm had been building among some of
us for years, even before the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in late
September 2001, as the deep flaws of the Oslo negotiating process
became increasingly evident. Today, of course, our alarm is
particularly acute, as our worst fears are being realized before our
very eyes. Each day, Israel, with the acquiescence, if not the active
support of the United States, goes about consolidating its control over
the land and water resources of the remainder of historic Palestine,
while penning the stubbornly resistant Palestinian people into what
amounts to large, open-air prisons in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.2
* Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law, Coordinator, Working Group on
Law and Peace Building in the Middle East. The working group is sponsored by the
Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research. The Toda Institute, based in
Japan, was the principal financial sponsor of this symposium, and I gratefully
acknowledge the Institute's generous support. We also greatly appreciate funding
received from the Interdisciplinary Humanities Center at the University of
California, Santa Barbara.
2. In May, 2004, Israel launched numerous military assaults in the Gaza Strip,
ostensibly to stem weapons smuggling across the Egyptian border. In that month
alone, over 60 Palestinians were reported killed and over 221 were wounded,
including many civilians. About 298 Palestinian residential buildings were
demolished, and over 710 families, over 80% of them refugees, were made homeless.
Rafah's infrastructure, agricultural resources, and many private and commercial
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This process, with all its attendant brutality, is unfolding before a
world community that appears either unable or unwilling to
productively intervene. Israel's apparent impunity from world
judgment, however, will not exempt it ultimately from the
consequences of its current actions. No one should mistake what this
program of usurpation and incarceration portends for the future:
further resistance by the Palestinians and further repression by the
Israelis. We will witness a series of explosions-both literal and
figurative-leading to more shattered and violated bodies, more
funerals, more grieving parents, both Israeli and Palestinian, and the
genuine danger of the spread of violence to the broader region of the
Middle East and beyond.
Is this bleak future really all that one can expect for the suffering
peoples of Israel/Palestine and for the rest of us? Can we be no more
than passive, impotent observers to a future of violence, pain, and
death? Implicitly, all of the symposium participants have addressed
this same question and have similarly answered, "No, there is an
alternative." The alternative that we envision is a future of peace
based on justice, equality, and respect for both individual human
rights and collective national rights, and secured through
international law. We are committed to exploring what one might
call, for short hand, a "rights-based" approach to peace in the Middle
East. For those of us who live and vote in the United States, a
country deeply implicated in the negative trajectory of developments
in Israel/Palestine and elsewhere in the surrounding region, there is
an additional sense of obligation to intervene constructively and
positively to avert future Israeli and Palestinian suffering.
As proponents of a "rights-based" approach to Middle East
peace, we cannot expect the virtues of our alternative approach to be
self-evident. The system of international rights and collective
security, painstakingly erected in the post-World War II period, faces
properties were also destroyed by the Israeli incursions. With an average of ten
persons per family unit in the Gaza Strip, the home demolitions have affected
thousands of Palestinians. See U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian
Refugees in the Near East, Supplementary Appeal for Rafah (May 31, 2004),
available at <http://www.un.org/unrwa/emergency/appeals/rafah-appeal.pdf>. Israel
was also continuing the construction of a "separation barrier" in parts of the West
Bank, extending an already suffocating system of closures, curfews, and other
restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. See
Human Rights Watch, Israel's 'Separation Barrier' in the Occupied West Bank:
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Consequences (Feb. 2004), at
<http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/20/isrlpa7581.htm>.
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unprecedented challenges today, and many doubt its capacity to
deliver on its noble purposes. Painfully, it is the United States that,
by its words and deeds, has been one of the leaders in the charge
against international law in a variety of spheres, in favor of a
unilateralist and militarist approach to international relations. The
litany is no doubt familiar and includes the Bush Administration's
refusal to sign the Kyoto Agreement against global warming, its
withdrawal of our signature from the treaty establishing the
International Criminal Court, and, of course, its act of illegal
aggression in attacking Iraq.3 Ongoing war crimes by our troops in
that afflicted country simply compound the original violation - one
that has already caused the deaths of uncounted thousands of Iraqis,
many of them innocent civilians.'
But the systematic marginalization of international law in U.S.
policy vis-A-vis Israel/Palestine in fact has an older and bipartisan
history. While the United States stood with the international
community in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war in calling for
Israel's withdrawal from occupied Arab territories, since that time the
United States under both Republican and Democratic
administrations has become Israel's chief abettor in flaunting
international law and the will of the international community. It has
done so in a variety of ways. The United States has abstained, often
alone, on four out of five U.N. Security Council Resolutions
regarding Israeli settlements since 1967; and it has abstained, again
usually alone, from 24 out of 52 Security Council Resolutions
3. On the illegality of the Iraq war, See George Bisharat, Facing Tyranny with
Justice, 7 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 1, (2003); Ken Roth, War in Iraq: Not a
Humanitarian Intervention, in WORLD REPORT 2004 (Human Rights Watch),
available at <http://www.hrw.org/wr2k4/3.htm>; CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
RIGHTS, Tearing up the Rules: The Illegality of Invading Iraq (Mar. 2003), available at
<http://cesr.org/node/view/523>.
4. See Center for Economic and Social Rights, Beyond Torture: U.S. Violations
of Occupation Law in Iraq (June 10, 2004), available at
<http://www.cesr.org/node/view/227>; Human Rights Watch, Summary of
International and U.S. Law Prohibiting Torture and Other Ill-treatment of Persons in
Custody (May 24, 2004), at
<http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/24/usint8614.htm>; Letter from Kenneth
Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to George W. Bush, President,
United States of America (May 18, 2004), at
<http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/17/usint8591.htm>; Letter from Kenneth
Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to Donald Rumsfeld, Defense
Secretary, United States of America (Jan. 12, 2004), at
<http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/12/usint6921.htm>.
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condemning Israeli violations of international law.5  In the last
decade, the United States has exercised nine of its last ten vetoes in
the Security Council on Israel's behalf.6 Since 1948, the United States
has maintained, almost without interruption, the flow of arms and
economic aid to Israel that has in large part made 37 years of Israeli
military occupation possible. More recently, it brought pressure on
Belgium to abandon the principle of universal jurisdiction that
undergirded the prosecution of Ariel Sharon, together with others
accused of responsibility for the Sabra and Shatila massacres of 1982.8
It also campaigned actively against the U.N. General Assembly's
request to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an advisory
opinion on the legal consequences arising from Israel's separation
barrier in the West Bank.9 Nonetheless, for many years the United
States did not openly demur from the international consensus
regarding the underlying legal issues and questions of rights at stake
in the conflict. It continued to uphold the principle of the
inadmissibility of territorial acquisition through war on which U.N.
Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 were based. It never
officially repudiated the 1978 finding by U.S. State Department Legal
Counsel Herbert Hansell that Israeli settlements in the West Bank
5. See Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations,
Summary of Security Council Resolutions on Palestine since 1948, available at
<http://www.palestine-un.org/res/res-sc.html> (last visited Dec. 4, 2004); Permanent
Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations, Summary of Security Council
Resolutions on Settlements since 1967, available at <http://www.palestine-
un.org/res/ressc.html> (last visited Dec. 4, 2004).
6. A chart of all exercises of vetoes in the U.N. Security Council is maintained at
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/membship/veto/vetosubj.htm>.
7. Since 1967, the United States has granted Israel $92 billion in total aid,
including $47 billion in military grants and $11 billion in military loans. See The
JewishVirtual Library of the American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, U.S.
Assistance to Israel (2004), available at
<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-
IsraelIU.S._AssistancetoIsraell.html>.
8. Ian Black & Ewan MacAskill, U.S. Threatens NATO Boycott Over Belgian
War Crimes Law, THE GUARDIAN, June 13, 2003, at
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/nato/story/0,12667,976499,00.html>. Global Policy
Forum, Universal Jurisdiction, available at
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/universal/univindex.htm> (last visited Dec. 4,
2004).
9. Rami G. Khouri, The Rule of Law, or Lawlessness and Terror?, THE JORDAN
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, available at
<http://www.aljazeerah.info/Opinion%20editorials/2004%20opinions/Feb/25o/The%
20rule%20of%201aw,%20or%201awlessness%20and%20terror%2ORami%20G%20
Khouri.htm>.
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and Gaza Strip were illegal." And until 1992 the United States voted
seven times in support of U.N. Security Council Resolutions to re-
affirm the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes or
receive compensation and support for resettlement." The United
States has simply acted in such a way as to communicate to Israel that
these legal principles were of no real consequence and hence could be
ignored.
A turning point was reached, however, with the signing of the
Oslo Accords in 1993, under the aegis of the Clinton Administration.
The Oslo Accords, while affirming that implementation of Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338 was integral to the peace process,
otherwise neglected the rich body of U.N. resolutions and other
sources of international law bearing on settlements, refugees,
resources, and many other specific dimensions of the conflict. 12
Instead - and this is a key transformation - the Oslo Accords
construed virtually all of the central issues in dispute (settlements,
refugees, the status of Jerusalem, borders, security arrangements, and
sovereignty) as "permanent status" issues subject to negotiation
between the parties. 3 While the Accords did not specifically eschew
legal rights as parameters for those negotiations, it has become
increasingly clear that the U.S. view, and that of the Israelis, as well, is
that negotiations are a substitute for the resolution of these issues
according to legal criteria. Indeed, the Israeli government in
appealing to the ICJ not to hear the case regarding the separation
barrier in February 2004 specifically invoked the Accords as a shield
against that litigation, arguing essentially that the Palestinians, in
signing the Accords, had agreed to negotiate, not litigate.'4 For their
10. The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR
Commission on Human Rights, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 8 at 84, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/18 (1994).
11. See Res. 89, U.N. SCOR, 524th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/1907 (1950); Res. 237, U.N.
SCOR, 1361st mtg. (1967); Res. 468, U.N. SCOR, 2221st mtg. (1980); Res. 484, U.N.
SCOR, 2260th mtg. (1980); Res. 694, U.N. SCOR, 2989th mtg. (1991); Res. 726, U.N.
SCOR, 3026th mtg. (1992); and Res. 799, U.N. SCOR, 3151st mtg., U.N. Doc
S/RES/799 (1992).
12. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept.
13, 1993, Isr.-PLO, art. I, 32 I.L.M. 1525.
13. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept.
13, 1993, Isr.-PLO, art. V, 32 I.L.M. 1525.
14. International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Written Statements of
Israel (Jan. 29, 2004), available at <http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm>.
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part, U.S. officials have, since Oslo, studiously avoided legal language
in discussing various dimensions of the conflict. Israeli settlements,
for example, are "obstacles to peace," but not illegal. The attacks on
civilians in Rafah and campaign of home demolitions there are "not
helpful," but not war crimes.
The Bush Administration's "Roadmap to Peace" continues the
earlier established pattern of reference only to Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338 and neglect of the body of more specific
resolutions dealing with various dimensions of the conflict.5 Yet
another qualitative step away from a law-informed approach to peace
was taken in April 2004 when President Bush repudiated the
Palestinian right of return and opined that Palestinians would have to
defer to demographic realities and accept the permanent annexation
of some West Bank Israeli settlements to Israel.'6
What accounts for this apparent indifference, if not hostility, to a
law-based approach to conflict resolution on the part of the two
dominant players in this conflict, the United States and Israel?
Frankly, I suspect the answer to this is complex, but one obvious
possibility presents itself: law, at least when it is respected, constrains
power. Israel, as a powerful player, simply doesn't want to accept the
constraints that international law would impose on it, and foresees a
more favorable substantive outcome through negotiations without
legal limitations. The United States, meanwhile, may either endorse
Israel's vision for the future of the region or be indifferent and sees
no need to upset a valuable ally.
Whatever the cause of this anti-legal inclination after more than
a decade of the Oslo "peace process," the reality should be obvious to
all: the region is more inflamed, more fearful and more angry than at
almost any point since 1967, if not before. Something clearly has
gone seriously wrong.
Probably many things have gone wrong, but at least one
hypothesis we have to consider is that this de-legalized approach to
the resolution of the conflict has seriously undermined the
possibilities for a durable agreement between Israel and the
Palestinians. It has done so primarily because it has left the
14 Press Statement, U.S. Dep't of State, A Performance-Based Roadmap to a
Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Apr. 30, 2003),
available at <http:/www.state.govlr/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm>.
16. Leaving Gaza, Settling in the West Bank?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 16, 2004,
available at
<http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?storyid=2592636>.
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Palestinians, the weaker party to the negotiations in virtually every
sense, militarily, politically, and economically, at the mercy of a much
more powerful adversary. Israel, moreover, has been backed by the
most powerful country in the world, the United States. The terms of
the agreement that Israel very nearly was able to force upon the
Palestinian leadership three to four years ago had all the hallmarks of
a humiliating surrender, rather than the starting point for relations of
mutual respect between two equal peoples.
It is past time to try a different approach, one that re-centers
international law in both public policy making and public discussion
of the Israel/Palestine conflict. What does a rights-based approach to
peace in Israel/Palestine offer that prior approaches have not? Let
me suggest just three advantages; there may well be others.
First, and most important, international law provides a baseline
of protection for both Israeli and Palestinian peoples, guaranteeing
that fundamental rights will not be compromised in a peace
agreement. Of course, as the weaker parties to the negotiations,
Palestinians currently need these protections more than do Israelis.
International law will at least partially offset the tremendous
imbalance of power that otherwise would permit Israel to dictate
terms to Palestinians that they might accept through compulsion, but
not embrace as just. However, it should not be lost that international
law protects the rights of both peoples, Palestinian and Israeli.
Second, a resolution based on broadly accepted principles of
international law and justice will have the greatest legitimacy between
the parties to the agreement and within the world community.
International covenants, U.N. Resolutions, and the practices of
nations enshrine the world community's most considered and
universal fundamentals of morality and justice. A resolution that
credibly conforms to them will be durable, unlike any that would
merely reflect the current imbalance of power between the parties.
An agreement based only on power differentials and that leaves one
side with a lingering sense of injustice will be inherently unstable,
while one that honestly and fairly addresses longstanding grievances
will be lasting.
Third, a rights-based resolution of the Israel/Palestine conflict
would be exemplary of an approach that might profitably spread to
other conflicts in the region, both international and sub-national. It
would be, moreover, consistent with the stated objective of U.S.
2005]
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policy to promote democracy and the rule of law in the Middle East. 7
There may be much to criticize in both the substantive vision of
"democratization" held by current American policy makers for the
Middle East, and even more so in their willingness to resort to
military means to bring it about, but the "freedom deficit" they
identify is an undeniable fact. Just as lawless behavior in Iraq by the
United States deeply undermines efforts toward "democratization,"
indelibly associating it with foreign occupation, and all the death,
destruction, and humiliation it entails," lawful behavior has the
capacity to legitimate and serve as a positive example that might spur
the growth of genuinely democratic elements in the region. A law-
based resolution will say to the people that respect for international
law and for U.N. resolutions is demanded of all nations and peoples
of the region, not just some.
What would a rights-based resolution to the Israel/Palestine
conflict look like? Our first task over the next day and a half will be
to flesh out some answers to this question. So we will take each of the
major dimensions of the conflict - settlements, refugees, water, the
status of Jerusalem - and try to give some specificity to the character
of a rights-based resolution with respect to each of them. Most of
these will be familiar to you as the "permanent status" issues of the
Oslo Accords. There are, however, some omissions from that list and
some other additions to it that I need to highlight.
The omissions, I should point out, are more by accident than by
design. We suffered some attrition from our original list of
contributors, so these gaps do not necessarily reflect our judgment
that the omitted topics are less worthy than the ones we do address.
Perhaps most notably, we do not directly examine questions of
borders and sovereignty as between Israel and a Palestinian state or
non-sovereign entity. This is certainly not because the topic is
straightforward. Clearly, there are a host of issues to be considered
and discussed here, given strong indications that any Palestinian
entity likely to emerge in the near future will exercise highly
17. See Wayne Washington, Bush Urges Mideast to Accept Democracy, BOSTON
GLOBE (Nov. 7, 2003), available at
<http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2003/11/07/bush-urges-mideast to-acc
ept-democracy>.
18. See Humanitarian Assistance Following Military Operations: Overcoming
Barriers, 108th Cong. (2003) (opening statement of Rep. Christopher Shays,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec., Emerging Threats, and Int'l Relations), available
at <http://www.house.gov/shays/reconstruction/const.htm>.
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compromised sovereignty, or none at all. Another topic we do not
directly take up is the basic legality or illegality, as the case may be, of
Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights, West Bank, and Gaza Strip,
nor of armed opposition to it. Again, these are important areas to
discuss.
The good news is that all of these topics, both the ones we have
on our agenda to discuss directly and those we do not, are only
partially severable. There is really a great deal of interconnection
between the various dimensions of the conflict. Discussions of
settlements, or Jerusalem, for example, implicate questions of
borders, sovereignty, water, and others. As we conduct our
discussions, therefore, we must take cognizance of some of the gaps in
our coverage and insure that some of the missing pieces of the puzzle
are filled in as we discuss the pieces with which they connect.
As to the additions, let me comment for now on just one, the
inclusion of a discussion of the status of Palestinian citizens of Israel.
This group has long been excluded from discussions about conflict
resolution between Israelis and Palestinians, notwithstanding the fact
that they are substantial in number (roughly 1.2 million people, about
20% of the population of Israel), the fact that they were historically
part of the Palestinian people and show increasing signs of re-
asserting that aspect of their identities in the present, and the fact that
they, like other Palestinians, have substantial grievances against the
Israeli state. 9 They have been treated, rather, as a domestic minority
whose concerns should be addressed within the context of the Israeli
sovereign state and as if they had no connection to Palestinians living
either under occupation or in exile. This occlusion of the Palestinian
citizens of Israel from discussions of peace between Israelis and
Palestinians seems artificial and wrong, and jeopardizes the chances
of a comprehensive settlement between the two peoples. We need to
ask whether the concerns of Palestinian citizens of Israel can and
should be integrated into the broader push for peace between Israelis
and Palestinians. Who should speak for them? What demands
should be made on their behalf? What would be the legal
underpinnings of the rights they might assert? If we make headway
on some of these questions, I think we will be adding something novel
19. The best source of information on the status of Palestinian citizens of Israel is
Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel. Reports and other
publications may be gained through their website at
<http://www.adalah.org/eng/index.php>.
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and extremely important to the public debate over peace in the
Middle East.
As to some of the issues that we address, there has long been a
fairly strong international consensus on their proper legal standing
and on where the rights lie. There is virtual unanimity (outside of
Israel) on the illegality of Jewish settlements. International law is not
immutable of course, and it is conceivable that some revisiting and
updating is necessary in respect to some issues. There has been some
discussion among commentators, for example, as to whether the U.N.
Secretary General's proposed resolution for Cyprus embodies a new
and different approach to the rights of refugees and whether it is one
that bears implications for the rights of Palestinian refugees. ° That is
all well and good, but we have to be a little more ambitious than to
simply restate or revise at the margins and instead push beyond
abstract definitions of rights in the direction of remedies. This is
where we may be able to make our most important and original
contributions, and break new ground.
After all, cynicism about international law - at least for many
members of the public - has never been about the substantive rights it
enshrines. Instead the cynicism turns on the perception of the
incapacity of the international system to vindicate and protect those
rights in reality. If our alternative rights-based approach is to win
adherents, we have to be able to offer concrete and pragmatic
proposals, not simply a shimmering mirage that retreats with every
step one takes in its direction. Our proposals need to be clear-eyed
and realistic in two senses. First, they need to take account of current
"facts," changed realities that demand flexibility in the kinds of
remedies we devise. Second, we have to begin to envision how to get
from here to there, that is, how to begin to actually enforce or
implement our proposals. Let me back up now and say just a few
things about these two needs.
First, as to the "facts" we must consider in imagining remedies.
We all know that the reference to "facts," or more fully, "facts on the
ground," is typically a euphemism for the surrender of Palestinian
rights. The common formulation is that some "fact" established by
Israel, such as the "realities on the ground and in the region" referred
to recently by President Bush in his statement regarding West Bank
20. See Eyal Benvenisti, The Right of Return in International Law: An Israeli
Perspective (2003) (unpublished draft), available at
<http://www.tau.ac.il/law/members/benvenisti/work.html >).
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settlements,21 must cause some Palestinian right (in this case, to be
free of illegal colonization of land slated for Palestinian self-
determination) to yield. Such a use of "facts" is clearly antithetical to
the rights-based approach we urge. At the same time, our suggestions
would be entirely unrealistic if they do not contemplate and
accommodate changed demographic, political, economic, social, and
other circumstances. So we have to seek a principled ground between
the use of "facts" to defeat rights and a purely abstract conception of
rights that has no possibility of implementation in the world as we
know it. What "facts" matter? Here is another "demographic
reality" that might be considered: by the year 2010, if current birth
rates continue, the number of Palestinians living within the borders of
former Palestine will equal, then exceed the numbers of Jews.22 Is this
a kind of "fact" that we should be considering? How should these
"facts" be accommodated in the fashioning of remedies, if at all?
When should "right" yield to "fact," or vice versa? These questions
are not at all easy, and there may not be one answer or one principle
that is applicable to all the issues we discuss. But they are important,
and we must address them as coherently as we can.
As to getting from here to there or crafting strategies for actual
enforcement or implementation, this is a key step. If we do not begin
to offer a vision of how to translate some of these ideas into reality,
eventually we will be dismissed properly as adding nothing truly
helpful to public discussion. If we implicitly assume that our
suggested remedies will be implemented via negotiations between the
parties, there is no guarantee that negotiations will even resume in
the foreseeable future, let alone on such a footing as to make proper
legal remedies even feasible. Therefore, we have to be as creative
and broad-minded as possible and consider the full range of
possibilities, from litigation in the courts of individual nations, to
actions within international organizations and tribunals, to public
campaigns and other kinds of actions launched within civil society.
The unfortunate probability is that we may only be able to rely in
limited ways on governments, and some of the heavy lifting may have
2 Leaving Gaza, Settling in the West Bank?, supra note 15.
21 See ARNON SOFER, ISRAEL DEMOGRAPHY 2000-2020: DANGERS AND
OPPORTUNITIES 18 (National Security Studies Center, University of Haifa) (2001).
See also Profile: Recent Israeli Actions Have Encouraged the Discussion of an Israeli-
Palestinian Binational State (All Things Considered on National Public Radio, Oct.
20, 2003), available at
<http://www.npr.org/programs/atc/transcripts/2003/oct/O31020.kenyon.html>.
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to be done by forces in civil society, one reason why we have carved
out some time tomorrow morning to consider these possibilities.
We do have to be candid about the limitations of international
law. It will never provide all the answers. In respect to some issues,
water, the status of Jerusalem, and perhaps others, international law
may provide only the broadest parameters for equitable resolutions.
Negotiations are thus crucial, and inevitable.
I have said enough in the way of preliminaries. I am delighted to
be here and more particularly delighted to be here with you, and I
look forward with hope to our discussions. I am caught between the
tension of knowing our limitations and the enormity of our challenge
on the one hand, and the importance, even necessity, of what we are
attempting on the other. I couldn't imagine a more inspiring cohort
on which to embark on this great challenge.
